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ABSTRACT
Effects of executive functioning on false memory in children
By Pamela Swift (Tessier), M.S.
Misremembering is a common phenomenon in normal human development that
has great potential to become problematic, especially in legal situations. The
Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) model
has been commonly used in the literature to uncover mechanisms for why these false
memories may occur. Children have only recently begun to be investigated using this
paradigm. Some related mechanisms in children for false recollection that have yet to be
investigated are child executive functioning and socioeconomic status. In the current
study, executive functioning was investigated as a potential mechanism for false
recollections using a DRM paradigm. Children completed a brief assessment of
intelligence followed by assessments of executive functioning. Participants then engaged
in the DRM recall and recognition task. Finally, they completed a semantic knowledge
task. Results indicated that specific aspects of executive functioning (inhibition and
cognitive flexibility) predicted false memory production at both recall and recognition.
Additionally, maternal education and gross family income had predictive value at recall
and recognition. However, a mediational model was not supported. These results help
explain mechanisms for false memory and can provide valuable information regarding
susceptibility to false memory production.
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Effects of executive functioning on false memory in children
Misremembering is a common phenomenon throughout the lifespan. People of all
ages are prone to false recollection of names, lists, places, and so on (e.g., Metzger et al.,
2008; Gold et al., 2007; Sugrue & Hayne, 2006). Misremembering may not be a terribly
detrimental event; falsely remembering that one needs to purchase sugar at the grocery
store is not going to have a dramatic impact on a person’s life or the life of another.
However, false memory becomes far more important when it occurs in a legal context.
For instance, in eyewitness memory reports, a false memory has potential to influence
court cases in a significant way. Thus, regardless of the usual banality of false memories
in everyday life, their considerable impact in legal contexts warrants extensive
investigation. And, over and above the false memory itself, more inquiry into the
correlates (i.e., the neurocognitive correlates) of their production could result in valuable
information that may point further mechanisms for the induction of false memories.
False Memory
Several theories have been put forth to describe the how false memories occur. Of
these, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) accounts
for the most parsimonious explanation for false memory development. Fuzzy-Trace
Theory states that, following an event, people are able to unearth two distinct memory
traces; verbatim and gist. The verbatim trace, or the verbatim memory for stimuli,
includes specific features of events such as perceptual features. The gist trace is schemabased or contains the overall theme of the presented words. When the verbatim trace
fades, the gist trace takes over and false memories are more likely to occur. For example,
after being presented with a verbal narrative that did not mention how a college student
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learned of the death of his family dog, one-week later verbatim memory had faded such
that numerous participants could no longer recall the narrative word for word (verbatim
trace). Gist memory took over and numerous adult participants falsely recalled that he
learned the news via receiving a phone call from his parents (raw data from Krackow,
Kania, & Travers, 2013). Fuzzy-Trace Theory is not specific to a single paradigm but
applies more generally to memory development and applies to a variety of cognitive
processes. Findings consistent with predictions based on Fuzzy-Trace Theory appear in
the literature on development of memory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 2009), false
memories (Holliday, Brainerd & Reyna, 2010), false confessions (Reyna, Holliday, &
Marche, 2002) and in other domains of cognition such as risky decision making (Reyna
et al., 2011) and cognitive functioning in Alzheimer’s disease (Brainerd et al., 2011).
The application of Fuzzy-Trace Theory to common procedures used to induce false
memories is reviewed below.
Leading Questions and Misinformation
Elizabeth Loftus, a pioneer in the field of eyewitness memory research, began
considering how false memories came about four decades ago (Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
Loftus went on to discover methods for inducing false memories, including the use of
leading questioning. Loftus (1975) conducted a series of experiments with nearly 500
undergraduate students at the University of Washington with the premise that simple
changes in the wording of a question may induce a false memory. Loftus was one of the
first researchers to consider the importance of transitioning memory research from word
lists to actual events. Loftus cited her own published and unpublished research which
suggested that memories regarding events, whether they be benign (e.g., one’s history of
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headaches) or a recently viewed car accident, were highly influenced based on the
wording of questions (“about how fast were the cars going when they
bumped/hit/smashed into each other?” p. 565). Stronger words (e.g., smashed) elicited
responses indicating higher speeds of the cars. If one accepts the leading terms of the
question, then that portion is incorporated into their memory. Later on, one may respond
to questions based on this construction that has the false memory in tow. In sum, Loftus
describes memory process as forming a cognitive representation of an experience
followed by a cognitive modification of that experience when additional information is
encountered. When this original event is remembered, the newly formed representation
is what is recalled as opposed to the original experience. This can lead to erroneous
responses if questioned about the original experience. If, during acquisition, a falsity is
introduced and accepted, later retrieval will result in the revival of that false memory.
Loftus furthered this line of investigation to discover that misinformation can be
used in other ways, aside from leading questions, to create false memories. The
misinformation paradigm generally includes three steps: experiencing or hearing about an
event (presentation stage), receiving information following the event (suggestion stage),
and a test of memory (test stage) (Loftus, 2005a; Loftus, 1975). The induction of false
memories is robust using this type of paradigm in both adults and children (Bruck &
Ceci, 1999; Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). Fuzzy-Trace Theory explains false memories in
this paradigm as the original event presented (verbatim trace) diminishes and the
suggested post-event information becomes incorporated into the memory trace. After this
occurs, the schema-based memory for the event takes over (gist memory) and is recalled.

FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN

4

Implanted Autobiographical Memory
Of particular concern in legal cases are implanted, or “repressed/recovered,”
autobiographical memories (Loftus, 1993). Memories of this type include recollections
for whole events that one believes they have experienced or witnessed. Several studies
have considered the situations and conditions where false autobiographical memories can
be implanted. The general methodology used across studies is that participants are
provided with a cover story of some sort to increase the likelihood that they will believe
the false memory induction (i.e., to make it plausible). Memories are implanted using a
variety of memory implantation techniques, often techniques used by memory recovery
therapists (Lynn, Lock, Loftus, Krackow, & Lilienfeld, 2003) such as guided imagery,
and participants are asked to report these memories aloud. For example, Mazzoni and
Memon (2003) provided participants with a bogus cover story about a made up medical
procedure that supposedly occurred when the adult participants were young children.
The researchers then used imagination to recover memories of this childhood event. Forty
percent of participants in the condition produced false memories, which was substantially
higher than a control condition. Therefore in these studies and in real world memory
recovery cases, autobiographical memories, including memories from childhood, are
weak. Recollections that coincide with the gist memory are created via presentation of a
cover story that includes some specific details of the event. The person is then left with
the feeling that this event may have occurred (it becomes “familiar” according to
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) and generates specific details consistent with the suggested gist
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). In the real world, this process is magnified by numerous
sessions in which memory recovery takes place, including expectancies that the client
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will be able to recall the traumatic event (Lynn et al., 2003). The person then comes to
believe this false memory.
Deese/ Roediger/ McDermott False Memory Methodology and Related Theory
The Deese/ Roediger/ McDermott (DRM) methodology has been regularly and
reliably used to study the production of false memories (Howe, 2005; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995). This methodology utilizes lists that contain words that can all be
categorized under a larger categorical term such as a basic level term (Blewitt &
Krackow, 1992). For example, a list may contain items like Dalmatian, collie, English
setter, boxer, but will not include the word “dog.” Despite this larger, categorical term
being left off the list, older children (Metzger et al., 2008) and adults (Howe, 2005;
Sugrue & Hayne, 2006) have a consistent, strong tendency to remember that basic-level
word. False memory for the “critical lure” is referred to as the DRM effect.
False memories produced by the DRM effect are consistent with the most
parsimonious theory of false memory development, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Brainerd &
Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Findings using the DRM model reveal that older
children and adults tend to exhibit higher rates of false memories than younger children
(Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011). This phenomenon is referred to developmental
reversals in false memories (Holliday et al., 2011). Fuzzy-Trace Theory has been used to
explain what is deemed the developmental reversal phenomenon; both verbatim and gist
memory increase with age, but it is the increase in gist memory that leads to
reconstructive memory processes (Holliday et al., 2011).
A second theory provides another explanation specifically for DRM false
memories, essentially suggesting that as individual’s age, they are more likely to activate
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memory systems that make them more capable of false memory. Association Activation
Theory (Howe, 2006) suggests that the critical lure in a DRM paradigm is activated via
semantic networks after reading the list items. Words that are more highly associated
with the critical lure would thus be more likely to activate semantic networks and lead to
false memory. These theories ultimately fit with evidence indicating that young children
are less prone to the DRM effect since they activate different memory networks than
older children and adults. Howe, Wimmer, and Blease (2009) assessed Association
Activation Theory, specifically backward associative strength, using DRM and
categorical lists. Backward associative strength refers to the strength between items in the
DRM list and the critical lure. They hypothesized that backward associative strength
would be key in false memory production. Using DRM lists (e.g., for the critical lure
bird- nest, fly, feathers) and category lists (e.g., bluejay, canary, eagle). Participants read
lists that were either categorical or DRM and either high, low, or equal in backward
associative strength. They discovered that false recall and recognition of these lists
increased (regardless of whether they were categorical or DRM) as backward associative
strength increased. This corroborated the assumptions of Association Activation Theory.
A third theory for false memories in the DRM methodology was developed by
Roediger and McDermott (2000). They explained this in a similar manner to Association
Activation Theory and referred to this theory as Activation-Monitoring Theory. They
described a similar mechanism by which, upon being presented with the list, individuals
activated the critical lure using their semantic networks. Thus, in adults, words with
strong associations are activated quickly and consistently, leading to heightened true and
false recall. The added component to their theory was a source-monitoring component,

FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN

7

which theoretically would reduce false memories. By making a decision about the source
of the memory, individuals should be better able to discount critical lures that may have
been brought to the forefront of their memory by semantic activation. This second aspect
of Activation-Monitoring Theory is suspect. Source-monitoring capabilities have been
found to increase with age (e.g., Roberts, 2000). Thus, logically children would then be
more prone to false memories. Indeed, this finding has been seen on occasion in the
literature (see Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002). However, the majority of research points
to young children having fewer false memory recollections using the DRM paradigm.
Specifically, the DRM methodology can serve as a proxy for real-life event false
memories. Reyna and colleagues (2007) argued that DRM word lists work in the same
way that memories for repeated exposure to abuse or neglect work. For example, if a
child victim of crime experiences similar events over the course of years, recent events
may cue memories for earlier events. By connecting these events, the details may become
fuzzy and intertwined. Reyna, Holliday, and Marche (2002) reviewed the implications of
the dominant theory behind why DRM memories occur (Fuzzy-Trace Theory). They
contended that Fuzzy-Trace Theory is incredibly pertinent in forensic investigations,
especially when children are being interviewed with leading questions or open-ended free
recall. Additionally, Poole (1995) argued that verbatim memories may become
“gistified.” Specifically, Poole noted that the predominant theory of DRM can be seen in
other contexts aside from those specifically mentioned in Fuzzy-Trace Theory research.
Brainerd, Reyna, and Poole, (2000) reasoned in their chapter that DRM and Fuzzy-Trace
Theory have their place in legal contexts; if a child is put through a round of leading
questions, the gist for an event may be made more apparent in the process, making their
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verbatim trace disappear. This is ultimately the same as the events that occur in the DRM
paradigm. The word list elicits the gist and the verbatim trace cannot discount it.
Therefore, false memory results from the same processes regardless of whether the
memory is for a traumatic event or word lists.
In summary, the preponderance of evidence points to DRM being a valid inductor
for false memory in research and proxy for real-life event false memories. This is largely
due to Fuzzy-Trace Theory and the broad reach of the theory in memory research.
Research using the DRM methodology in adults and children will now be reviewed.
Initially, research on the DRM false memories using DRM methodology was conducted
primarily with adults. In recent years, children have been included when studying this
method of inducing false memories.
DRM in adults
The literature on the DRM effect has largely focused on adults. Adults, compared
to children, are more prone to falsely recalling critical lures when lists are longer (Sugrue
& Hayne, 2006), but also have more accurate recall (Metzger et al., 2008) suggesting a
developmental trend; as individuals age, they are not only able to accurately recall words
at a better rate, they are also more prone to false recall.
Khanna and Cortese (2009) investigated the importance of presentation modality
when using DRM lists. Specifically, they assessed children (ages 8-9) and adults’ false
memories when presenting lists orally and visually. Interestingly, the authors found that,
with orally presented lists, children had a higher proportion of false to true recall. Adults
showed the opposite trend. They also found a relatively higher false recall rate in
children. When using visual (written) lists, adults had higher rates of false and true recall
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than children. These results suggested that adults process information differently and in a
more consistent manner than children, regardless of modality, since their proportion and
relative rates of false memory stayed fairly similar. The authors suggested that when
studying false memories, information-processing differences must be considered.
DRM in children
Relatively recently, researchers have begun to consider how DRM lists may
impact the memory of children. In general, younger children have been found to be less
prone to the DRM effect (e.g., Howe 2005; Metzger et al., 2008). This may seem
counterintuitive, but theories (see above) suggest that this is due to less developed
language and memory systems.
Holliday, Reyna, and Brainerd (2008) found a developmental increase in memory
of critical lures in children ages 7-to-13-years-old. Specifically, 7-year-olds remembered
significantly fewer lures than older children. It seemed that repetition of lists, as well as
giving children the theme of the list (different from the critical lure), increased false
memories as well. Children as old as fifth-graders have been found to make DRM errors
in a similar manner to adults in low-demand (i.e., recognition) scenarios (Metzger et al.,
2008). As noted previously, Khanna and Cortese (2009) uncovered that 8- to 9-year-olds
are capable of having proportionately and relatively higher rates of false memory than
adults. Metzger and colleagues (2008) ran a series of experiments using modified DRM
lists with words approved by 2nd grade teachers and piloted on children (2nd and 5th
graders). When using these associative word lists, Metzger et al. (2008) noted an
advantage; by using developmentally appropriate lists, younger children demonstrated an
increase in accurate recall and made fewer recall and recognition errors. College students
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also improved in their false recognition errors when using lists including words approved
for younger children.
Children’s remembering capabilities could also be affected by the emotional
valence of the word list. Howe, Toth, and Cicchetti (2011) considered this important area
of inquiry with both maltreated and non-maltreated child participants (ages 6-12).
Memory distortions following trauma are not uncommon (e.g., Cicchetti & Valentino,
2006) and, should legal proceedings result from trauma, these false or distorted memories
could be detrimental in court. As per developmental trend, older children recalled more
words and this occurred regardless of maltreatment history. However, children had a
harder time suppressing emotional words when told that they should forget the emotional
list in favor of remembering a second list. Thus, although still capable, children overall
have a more difficult time suppressing emotional words as opposed to neutral words. To
summarize, the research suggests that older children and adults are equally susceptible to
DRM errors and, thus, are potentially likely to exhibit false memories after list
presentation.
Individual Differences in False Memories
Individual differences are an important area of consideration in regards to how
false memories are produced. Aside from age, researchers have identified several factors
that may influence false memory induction on an individual basis. For example,
individuals who have experienced trauma or sexual abuse in the past (and have notable
PTSD symptoms) may be more prone to false memories (Goodman et al., 2011). Zhu and
colleagues (2010b), using a misinformation paradigm, discovered several personality
dimensions related to false memory, including persistence, cooperativeness, self-
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dependence, reward-directedness, and coping skills. Additionally, depression and
cognitive abilities were also (negatively) correlated with false memory production (Zhu
et al., 2010b). Finally, studies have considered how socioeconomic status may affect the
induction of false memories (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2004). There is a wealth of
research still to be done on why false memories are more likely to be produced in one
person, but not another.
Nearly all of the studies reviewed below have used an undergraduate population
and have only begun to scratch the surface of the relationship between
neuropsychological functioning and false memories. Bixter and Daniel (2013) explored
the relationship between false recollection and working memory using two different
experiments; one with a forewarning for participants about the tendency of DRM lists to
lead to false memories and another where this forewarning was absent. Those participants
with larger working memory capacity had fewer false memories, but also fewer
“remember” responses, or responses where the participant consciously recollected the
word (as opposed to having a “feeling” that it was a word they had seen before), though
this was only when a forewarning regarding the DRM task occurred. Peters and
colleagues (2006) also discovered slight executive dysfunction in undergraduate students
who tended to falsely remember critical lures. In Howe, Toth, and Cicchetti‘s (2011)
assessment of both maltreated and non-maltreated children’s memory abilities, they also
considered verbal and perceptual IQ in order to relate cognitive functioning to these
inhibitory abilities. They found that children’s verbal IQ was significantly associated with
their recall rates. When verbal IQ was controlled for, maltreated and non-maltreated
children had similar recall abilities. Additionally, older children (ages 10-12) were better
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able to recall true memories than younger children (ages 6-9), but the groups were equal
in their false memory recall rates. Zhu and colleagues (2010a) assessed the relationship
between cognitive factors (intelligence, perception, memory, and face judgments) and
false memories after a misinformation test in college students. The misinformation test
included a 50-slide story told in pictures, of which 12 were particularly important since
they were to be inaccurately described in a narration following a 30-minute delay. These
narrations were 50 sentences, one for each slide, with 12 being inaccurate. Following
another 10-minute delay, participants completed two tasks; one related to recognition and
another that assessed source monitoring abilities. Their results suggested that lower
intelligence and visuospatial skills were linked to increased false recognition memories,
but that having false memories is not necessarily indicative of simply poor memory in
general. Specifically, having what researchers deemed “Robust False Memory” (e.g.,
endorsing the pictures as the source of their false memory or saying that the picture and
the narration were both the same) was not significantly associated with recall and
recognition tasks on the Wechsler Memory Scales. Additionally, when including other
cognitive abilities in a regression, memory scores did not uniquely predict false
recognition memory, suggesting that other areas of cognition should be considered in this
process.
Studies have already suggested that working memory capacity is associated with
false memory induction, but no studies have simultaneously assessed other executive
function capacities (e.g., cognitive flexibility and inhibition). Tests of inhibition, or the
ability to control one’s attention in order to ignore or override external lures (Diamond,
2013) may be associated with false memory, especially in the DRM task. Inhibitory
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control may be necessary in order to ignore the gist of the DRM list and only recall the
verbatim list. More broadly, being able to discount and override information from past
experiences and events is crucial to event reporting as an eyewitness. Additionally,
cognitive flexibility, which Diamond (2013) conceptualizes as being built from the other
two areas of executive functioning, may be important in false memory. The ability to
change focus and perspective is enormously important in legal cases where techniques
like the cognitive interview, which includes a change perspectives component, are being
used to obtain a narrative of an event from a child. As a result, having enhanced cognitive
flexibility makes false memory induction more difficult. Finally, socioeconomic status
has been demonstrated as having an effect on both executive functioning and false
memory production; specifically, children from lower socioeconomic status backgrounds
are more prone to deficits in executive functioning (Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008; Hackman
& Farah, 2009; Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010) and more false memories (Howe,
Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006). Thus, socioeconomic status will be an important consideration
for the current study.
Executive functioning and socioeconomic status.
Executive functioning comprises several cognitive skills including planning,
working memory, inhibitory control, attention, and cognitive flexibility, among other
higher-order skills. Executive functioning has been shown to be moderately correlated
with IQ with ranges, depending on the executive functioning test, of R2 from .14 to .55
(Arffa, 2007). Recent evidence suggests that socioeconomic status, a proxy for several
variables related to family income and access to community resources, may impact
neuropsychological functioning (e.g., Noble, Houston, Kan, & Sowell, 2012; Blair 2010).
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Noble and colleagues (2012) found that differences in socioeconomic status, over
and above race, IQ, and gender differences, were highly associated with differences in
brain volume across the hippocampus and the amygdala. Differences in the left superior
temporal gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus were also associated with socioeconomic
status differences and increased with age. Noble and her colleagues suggested that home
linguistic environment and stress may be the mechanisms of these variations. Blair
(2010) discussed the effects of early environmental stress resulting from insufficient
resources on hormones and neurotransmitters. Blair noted that, for example, heightened
presence of cortisol could change neural development, altering executive functioning and
behavioral skills. Additionally, Blair and colleagues (2011) found that higher levels of
salivary cortisol during infancy and toddlerhood was related to diminished executive
functioning abilities at age 3. Noble and colleagues (2012) proposed a model by which
socioeconomic status may impact neurocognitive capabilities, including language
development, memory, and other aspects of executive functioning. Specifically, they
suggest that stress and the linguistic environment at home impacts memory, emotion, and
self-control centers, as well as areas of the brain important for language development in
the brain (Noble, Houston, Kan, & Sowell, 2012). Additionally, even exposure to stress
in the prenatal environment can have lasting effects in childhood and adolescence in
regard to hippocampal volume (Qui et al., 2013), cortical volume (Davis et al., 2013) and
amygdala volume (Buss et al., 2012).
The brain areas involved in executive functioning processes (e.g., the prefrontal
cortex) do not tend to reach full development until the early 30s (e.g., Watson et al.,
2011). Researchers have suggested that this slow postnatal maturation may make
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individuals more susceptible to environmental influences, including the effects of low
environmental resources from growing up in a low socioeconomic status family
(Hackman & Farah, 2009; Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). Recently, Nesbitt, BakerWard, and Willoughby (2013) examined executive functioning as a mediator in the
relationship between socioeconomic status and race on academic achievement.
Socioeconomic status and racial identity did not have any direct effect on mathematic or
literary achievement outcomes, but worked indirectly through kindergarten executive
functioning. Specifically, higher socioeconomic status and being of European (rather than
African American) descent was related to higher kindergarten executive functioning,
which led to higher math and literary achievement.
Historically, socioeconomic status has been an incredibly difficult construct to
measure. The APA Task Force on Socioeconomic Status (2007) has largely recognized
the difficulties inherent with measuring socioeconomic status and has called for
psychologists to consider this construct carefully in research and practice. A recent
review suggested that the use of composite measures of socioeconomic status (e.g., the
Hollingshead Index of Social Position) are inappropriate as they are unable to pinpoint
the driving force for differences in data (Diemer et al., 2012). Rather, these measures
compile multiple aspects into one score (i.e., parental education, household income,
occupational prestige, etc.) and tell the user little about how each specific aspect of
socioeconomic status is changing the results. Thus, the literature suggests that a more
appropriate strategy is to ask multiple questions relating to different aspects of
socioeconomic status and to analyze these separately to ensure that important information
is not lost during analyses (Diemer et al., 2012).
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To summarize, both socioeconomic status and executive functioning have clear,
far-reaching effects on many areas of child development including memory and, without
including them both, it would be difficult to ascertain the true contribution of one towards
false memory production.
Semantic knowledge.
Semantic or verbal fluency tasks are those that require participants to name as
many objects as they can that fit into a category within some time limit (Lezak, 1995) or
by categorizing pictorial images. In adults, links have been made between semantic
fluency and false memory production. Specifically, Koutsaal and colleagues (2003) had
healthy younger and older adults study and then identify ambiguous (e.g., drawn and then
slightly altered via software) pictures of common items. In some conditions the pictures
were labeled with the item’s category prior to item presentation while in other conditions
the objects went unlabeled. They found that older adults in the labeled condition were
more prone to false recognition and identified previously unseen objects as studied
objects. Gold and colleagues (2007) mimicked this procedure and noted similar results
for Alzheimer’s disease patients; those with Alzheimer’s disease tended to identify more
objects as previously seen, resulting in higher rates of false recognition. The authors
suggested that the increase in false recognition may be due to dysfunction in either the
hippocampus at memory retention or the prefrontal cortex at memory retrieval. Joubert
and colleagues (2010) noted cortical degeneration of the anterior temporal lobe and the
inferior prefrontal cortex in patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment and in
those with Alzheimer’s disease, partially supporting Gold and colleague’s (2007)
suggestions. In another study with participants who ranged from young adult to older
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adults with mild dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, there was an increase noted in false
recall as a function of age and dementia, as well as a proportional increase in false recall
to correct recall with age and dementia (Watson, Balota, & Sergent-Marshall, 2001).
Several studies have aimed to identify links between brain disease or
developmental disorder with verbal fluency (e.g., Bourke et al., 2011; Anderson et al.,
2002). This is accomplished typically by administering the COWAT and having children
name as many items as they can starting with a specific letter (e.g., F, A, or S; Benton,
Hamsher, & Sivan, 1983). For example, Anderson and colleagues (2002) showed that
children with frontal lesions did comparatively worse than children with phenylketonuria,
hydrocephalus, or control children. This suggests the importance of the frontal lobe in
verbal fluency in children as well. Children with heavy prenatal alcohol exposure
performed significantly worse than counterparts with ADHD and control on the COWAT
letter fluency test. In semantic (category) fluency, children exposed to alcohol prenatally
continued to have a significantly worse performance than peers with ADHD and
marginally worse than the control group (Vaurio, Riley, & Mattson, 2008). Additionally,
a trending relationship between severity of hypoxia and verbal fluency was noted among
children with varying degrees of sleep disordered breathing (Bourke et al., 2011).
Of note, no studies known to this author have examined how semantic knowledge
specifically may predict false memories in typically developing children and adolescents
using word lists. Importantly, if semantic knowledge is heavily relied upon, false recall
and recognition may be more common in children and adolescents.
The current study will examine executive functioning and false memory induction
in children with at least average intelligence. Specifically, three aspects of executive
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functioning will be examined: working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition.
Two age groups of children will be included in order to examine whether executive
functioning impacts the expected pattern of developmental reversals in false memories.
As the aforementioned literature suggests, socioeconomic status is an important
consideration for both false memory and executive functioning. Thus, socioeconomic
status will also be examined as a potential mediator in the relationship between executive
functioning and false memory production. Additionally, semantic knowledge will be
considered as a driving force in this relationship.
Hypotheses and Exploratory Questions
Hypothesis 1 and 2
Younger children (ages 7 and 8) will have lower false recall rates of the critical
lure in the DRM task than older children (ages 12 and 13). Older children will, however,
perform more accurately on the recognition task.
Rationale.
The conclusion in DRM research is that younger children will be less likely to
falsely recall the critical lures and older children will have better recognition on the DRM
recognition task (Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011; Metzger et al., 2008; Sugrue & Hayne,
2006).
Hypothesis 3 and 4
Children with better executive functioning will perform more accurately on the
recognition task, meaning that they will accurately recognize a greater number of
previously presented words, and will make fewer recognition errors involving never
presented words.
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Rationale.
Children with better executive functioning skills (inhibition, working memory,
and cognitive flexibility) may also be better able to resist false responses and discount
them as words not seen on DRM lists.
Hypothesis 5
Children from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds will perform more
accurately on the DRM recognition task.
Rationale.
Howe and colleagues (2004) found that children from low socioeconomic status
backgrounds performed significantly worse than children from middle socioeconomic
status backgrounds on a DRM recognition task.
Exploratory Question 1
Will socioeconomic status predict false memories for the critical lure? Howe and
colleagues (2004) examined false memory responses to the critical lure at recall and did
not find significant differences between low and middle socioeconomic status children.
Exploratory Question 2
Will socioeconomic status mediate the relationship between executive functioning
and false memories, if one is found to exist in the above analyses?
Exploratory Question 3
Will performance on the COWAT account for the differences in memory
performance (i.e., will semantic processing skills account for false memory production)?
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Participants
IRB approval was obtained from West Virginia University. Participants (N = 62)
included children from two age groups; middle childhood (ages 7 and 8; 2nd and 3rd
grade; n = 30) and early adolescents (ages 12 and 13; 7th and 8th grade; n = 32). These age
groups will be described as “younger” and “older” children in subsequent results and
discussion. One younger child’s data was removed from analyses as this child’s data were
deemed uninterpretable due to parent interjections and interruptions throughout testing.
Two children had a WASI-II score in the below average range (FSIQ < 85) and were not
included in analyses. Additionally, several children (n = 7) were noted as having a history
of a psychological disorder (ADHD = 4, Learning Disorder = 1, Sensory Processing
Disorder = 1, Tourette’s Syndrome = 1). These children were ultimately included in
analyses as their results on measures of intellectual ability and executive functioning did
not differ significantly from their peers (all ps > .05). Thus, the number of older children
included was n = 31 and younger children was n = 28. Groups were relatively even with
regard to gender (total males = 32, females = 27) and most were Caucasian (n = 57;
93.2%). Children were recruited from the greater Morgantown and central/northern
Vermont communities and came from a range of socioeconomic status backgrounds (e.g.,
Gross Family Income range = $0-$14,999 to $200,000 or more; M = 7.34, SD = 2.892;
for reference, 7 = $90,000 - $99,999, 8 = $100,000 - $124,999). No geographic
differences were noted with regard to gross family income or child FSIQ (ps > .05),
however a difference was noted in age and maternal education with older children being
recruited from the Morgantown community (t = 2.187, p = .033) and mothers from the
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Morgantown community having higher education (t = 2.571, p = .0064). Of the 59
participants, 18 of them were sibling pairs. Analyses regarding sibling effects suggested
very low effect sizes for all of the false memory outcome variables (Cohen’s ds range =
.040 to .052). Table 1 includes a complete breakdown of demographic information by
younger and older child age groups.
Materials
DRM word lists.
The six normed lists from Metzger and colleagues (2008; modified from Roediger
& McDermott, 1995) were included. These lists were modified to increase the chance
that young children were familiar with each word in the presented list. Each of the 6 lists
contained eight words. These materials were selected because they contain words that
are normed for children in this age range and because the expected patterns of memory
findings consistent with the majority of other studies occurred using these stimuli
(developmental reversals in false memory, developmental reversals in recognition).
Delayed Recognition
The same DRM word lists were incorporated into a recognition task to assess
delayed memory for critical lures. A word list containing 108 words was created using
validated DRM lists, both presented and unpresented (Metzger et al., 2008).
Semantic knowledge.
As a test to see whether semantic and conceptual knowledge is the true driving
force behind the developmental reversal phenomenon, children were asked to complete
the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton, Hamsher, & Sivan, 1983).
In order to establish that participants in this study viewed the basic-level terms as being
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categorical exemplars or associates to the critical lure, the first ten participants completed
a matching task where they were asked to read a word and then choose the category it
best matched with. This was created using all of the words from the DRM lists as well as
words from other normed DRM lists not used in this study. Since participants performed
well on this task (M = 80.7% correct matches), we substituted this task for a simpler,
briefer task, the COWAT. The COWAT allowed for the examination of a semantic
activation correlate to false memories. Essentially, since the participants were able to
perform well on this task, it indicated that some semantic knowledge existed and that the
words could be judged as belonging to their appropriate category. The COWAT has an
added bonus of pre-existing norms for most of these age groups. However, no norms
exist for age 13, so age 13 data for this study was calculated based upon the 12-year-old
norms (Halperin et al., 1989). Children were asked to list verbally all of the animals they
could in one minute (norms exist) followed by all of the vegetables they could in one
minute (no norms currently exist).
Intelligence.
Previous research has suggested that poor performance on tests of intellectual
ability may be related to poorer executive functioning (Barbey et al., 2012; Brydges et al.,
2012) and memory (Allen, Martin, & Martin, 2012), though this research has been mixed
(Arffa, 2007; Friedman et al., 2006; Ackerman et al., 2005). IQ was also used as a ruleout; if participants scored below one standard deviation from the average they were
removed from further analyses. Each participant was administered the two-subtests form
of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler,
2011). Each participant completed the Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary subtests. These
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two subtests load onto a Full Scale IQ score to give an estimate of intellectual ability.
Matrix Reasoning is an assessment of perceptual reasoning skills and Vocabulary is a
measure of verbal comprehension.
Executive functioning.
The Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth
Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2004) served as a test of working memory, an important
aspect of executive functioning. In addition, two measures from the Developmental
Neuropsychological Assessment, Second Edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, Kirk & Kemp,
2007a, 2007b) were administered to assess what Diamond (2013) deemed as the core
components to executive functioning; working memory, inhibition, and cognitive
flexibility. As stated, working memory was covered in the Digit Span subtest of the
WISC-IV, specifically Digit Span Backwards. For inhibition, the Inhibition subtest of the
NEPSY-II was administered. Inhibition requires the child to give a novel response in
favor of an automatic response. Specifically, they must first say the exact shape or
directional arrow they see on a screen, then they must inhibit the automatic response to
say the opposite. Finally, for cognitive flexibility, Animal Sorting of the NEPSY-II was
administered. This task requires the child to sort cards into two piles, based upon sorting
rules, of four cards each.
Demographics.
After the parent and child completed the consent and assent forms, respectively,
the parent was asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding demographics, income, and
parent education to serve as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Parents were also asked to
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endorse or deny nonspecific history of psychological disorder, head injury, or O2
deprivation history for their child.
Procedure
Following parental and consent and child assent one parent completed the
demographic form. Children were then administered the WASI-II and executive
functioning assessment battery on an individual basis by a graduate student (all
completed by PS). First, they completed the WASI-II subtests; Matrix Reasoning and
Vocabulary. Following this task, each child then completed the two tests of executive
functioning of the NEPSY-II, Animal Sorting and Inhibition. They completed the WISCIV Digit Span subtest following the NEPSY-II. Both the NEPSY-II tests and the Digit
Span subtest were completed on Apple iPads using Q-Interactive software (NCS Pearson,
Inc., 2016). One iPad was designated as the Examiner iPad and contained software for
creating clients, designing test batteries, conducting the assessments, and reviewing
results. The other iPad was designated as the Client iPad and was only used for the
Inhibition subtest of the NEPSY-II. The Client iPad displayed the sample and test
patterns of shapes or arrows, which the child was required to identify. During testing,
results screens were skipped so as to avoid any bias introduction into the study.
Next, children were given basic instructions regarding the DRM memory task
(Metzger et al., 2008). They were told that words would be presented on an audio
recorder and that they would need to try to remember as many words as they can once the
recording is done. Accordingly, they were instructed to listen carefully prior to the tape
recorder being turned on. Participants listened to each of the 6 word lists containing 8
words each on a recording. Words were read clearly and loudly by this author at a speed
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of one word every two seconds. After each list, the child was immediately asked to recall
as many words as they could. Afterwards, the second list was presented, followed by
recall for that list. This continued in such a pattern until all six lists had been read.
Similar to previous research (e.g., Holliday et al., 2011), children participated in a filler
task for 30-seconds involving addition problems in order not to interfere with semantic
processing.
Finally, for the delayed recognition task, children were read some words that were
previously presented and some new words that were not previously presented out loud.
They were then asked to verbally respond ‘yes’ to words they were presented with
previously and ‘no’ to words that they believed were not presented on the audio
recording. This recognition list included 108 words, as per Metzger and colleagues
(2008); (a) 48 previously presented and 60 previously never presented words, including
four of the critical lures. Children were instructed not to guess and to only say ‘yes’ to
the words they are certain they heard, as per Roediger and McDermott’s (1995)
instructions. Children were then administered the semantic knowledge matching test
(participants 1-10) or the COWAT (the remaining 52 participants). Finally, they were
debriefed on the nature of the study. Participants received a small compensation ($20) as
a thank you for participating in the study.
Results
Data Analyses: Overview
Because younger children tend to engage in positive response bias (saying yes)
more often, raw hit rates for recognition may not always be appropriate (e.g., Brainerd et
al., 2002). Therefore, a variation of signal detection will be used, specifically A’.

FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN

26

Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) first introduced this technique as a method for correcting
biased responding in memory recognition tasks. These formulas result in a manner such
that when A’ = 0.5, there is a lack of true recognition (accepting targets more often than
distractors) or a lack of semantic false recognition (accepting distractors that foil the
studied material over unrelated distractors). When A’ = 1, perfect true or false recognition
exists. A’ will be calculated from participant responses on the recognition task. Of note
for this study are the A’ for true positive responses (e.g., saying “Yes” when the word
was previously presented, a “Hit”) and for false positives (e.g., saying “Yes” when the
word was not previously presented, a “False Alarm”).
Four separate multiple regressions were run to assess the relation between age,
socioeconomic status (e.g., gross family income and parent education), cognitive
abilities, and executive functioning on 1) proportion of critical lure production at recall,
2) critical lure memory on the recognition task, 3) A’ for true positive responses and 4) A’
for false positive responses. When mediation analyses were indicated, stepwise
regressions were used to identify socioeconomic status as a mediator in the relationship
between measures of executive functioning and false memory. Predictors were normally
distributed and fit the assumptions necessary for regression analyses.
Immediate False Memories: Free Recall Memory Accuracy
Table 2 includes means and standard deviations for participant tasks. To assess
immediate false memory recall, the proportion of critical lures remembered during recall
was calculated. The proportion was calculated to take into account the number of words
accurately remembered during recall as well. For example, if a child remembered 35 of
the 48 possible words, and also remember 3 of the critical lures, then the proportion of
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critical lure recall would be .0789 (e.g., 3/38). Higher proportions represent increased
false memory for critical lures. Results of the regression analysis suggested that each of
the measured aspects of intellectual ability, as well as performance on the Animal Sorting
subtest of the NEPSY-II and mother’s highest degree achieved were related to critical
lure recall proportion. Age of the participant (entered as a categorical variable to assess
whether developmental reversals of false memory exist in this sample) did not appear to
predict performance on the free recall task (t = -.955, p = .348). Better performance on
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning predicted higher critical lure proportion (Vocabulary: t
= 2.572, p = .016; Matrix Reasoning: t = 2.543, p = .017). Interestingly, higher overall
FSIQ-2 predicted lower critical lure recall (t = -2.662, p = .013). On the Animal Sorting
subtest, the total number of correct sorts was predictive of higher critical lure recall
proportion (t = 2.158, p = .040). Finally, higher maternal educational achievement was
predictive of higher critical lure recall proportion (t = 2.683, p = .012). Table 3
summarizes the results of these analyses. All of the other aspects of executive functioning
(e.g., other scales on the Inhibition subtest, Digit Span Backwards), as well as the results
of the COWAT, revealed non-significant predictive value.
Due to the significant relation of the measures of executive functioning (e.g.,
Animal Sorting number of correct sorts scaled score) and mother’s education to critical
lure recall proportion, early steps to test the assumptions of mediation analysis were
conducted with the executive functioning measure as the independent variable, mother’s
education as the mediating variable, and critical lure recall as the dependent variable.
However, in these analyses, none of the predictor variables were significantly related to
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critical lure recall on their own (all ps > .05), suggesting that this mediation was not
appropriate (Figure 1).
Delayed False Memories for the Critical Lure: Recognition
As a method of assessing delayed false memories, the number of critical lures that
were responded to with a positive (Yes) response was calculated. This positive response
was indicative of the participant saying they had heard the critical lure previously on the
word lists. Thus, a higher number of critical lures recognized during this task would
suggest more false memories. No significant predictions emerged from this analysis in
regards to age, socioeconomic status, executive functioning, or semantic knowledge
(Table 6).
Hit Rate on Recognition
Signal detection was used to calculate the “Hit” rate (e.g., accurate identification)
on the recognition task. Again, signal detection was used to take into the account the
tendency of young children towards a positive response bias (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2002).
The resulting proportion from the signal detection correction was used as the outcome
variable. In these analyses, only age and gross family income emerged as significant
predictors of Hit rate. Specifically, older participants tended to have higher “Hit” rates
than younger children (t = 2.316, p = .028). Additionally, participants whose families had
higher gross family income had lower Hit rates (t = -3.011, p = .006). No significant
predictions emerged for any measures of executive functioning or semantic knowledge
(Table 7).
False Alarm Rate on Recognition
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Signal detection was also used to calculate the False Alarm rate (e.g., false
memories) on the recognition task. Again, the resulting proportion from the signal
detection correction was used as the outcome variable. In these analyses, only the
Inhibition Switching Combined score on the NEPSY-II showed predictive capabilities.
Participants who performed better on this aspect of the Inhibition subtest showed fewer
false memories on the delay (t = -2.260, p = .032). No significant predictions emerged for
any other measures of executive functioning, age, socioeconomic status, or semantic
knowledge (Table 8).
Discussion
This study aimed at evaluating the effects that executive functioning may have on
false memory production. Multiple instances where executive functioning was an
important predictor of false memory are highlighted by the current results. These results
could shed light on different methods to use or actions to take when engaging children in
a forensic interview following their witnessing of a crime.
Results were mixed in regards to executive functioning. Cognitive flexibility and
inhibition were both predictive of false recognition. The total number of sorts identified
in the Animal Sorting subtest of the NEPSY-II predicted critical lure recall, with higher
scores being associated with increased false recall. This may suggest that children who
were less rigid in their approach to the Animal Sorting task (i.e., children who had more
cognitive flexibility) may have more fluidly recalled words without attending to whether
they were actually heard or if they were just similar, semantically. This approach may
make children more prone to memory errors. This result can also be viewed from the lens
of Fuzzy Trace Theory; participants who identified more themes (i.e., the “gist”) had
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higher false recall. In regards to inhibition, children who performed well on Inhibition
Switching Combined (which combines the scaled scores of completion time and errors)
had fewer false memories at recognition. This task is incredibly complex and requires
strong inhibitory skills. Thus, this subset of children who performed well on this task
were also well set up to be able to discount the critical lure and have fewer false
memories at recognition. Working memory appeared to play no significant role with this
sample of participants. However, the use of Digit Span backwards as a measure of
working memory is limited.
Critical lure proportion at recall was predicted by all aspects of IQ measurement.
Better performance on both the Vocabulary and the Matrix Reasoning scales predicted
higher proportion of critical lure memory (i.e., higher false memory rates) immediately
after words were presented. One explanation could be that if a child has a more extensive
vocabulary, they may make connections between words more easily, thus leading to the
critical lure memory when it was not presented. This finding was also noted in previous
research as well (e.g., Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011). The similar association between
the visuospatial subtest of Matrix Reasoning could be explained by children creating
some sort of visual representation of the words they are attempting to remember.
Children with higher visuospatial skills could have thus been creating some sort of
pictorial representation of the words and associating them in a similar manner. This result
would actually be in opposition to previous studies noting that lower perceptual IQ is
associated with increased false memory, though at recognition (Zhu, 2010a). The
immediacy of false memory at recall may be an important factor here.
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Surprisingly, false memories at recall and recognition were not related to normed
results on the COWAT. Previous research with adults had suggested that semantic
fluency would be important in recognition (e.g., Koutsaal et al., 2003). Given that no
studies have been done to assess this relationship prior to the current study and because,
intuitively, this relationship seems reasonable, future research should continue to consider
semantic fluency as a potential predictor to false memories.
Children with a lower overall FSIQ-2 predicted higher critical lure memory at
recall. This is especially interesting considering the two scales which comprise FSIQ-2
(Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) were associated with critical lure memory in the
opposite direction. This may be due to the additive nature of how FSIQ-2 is calculated.
Individually, having higher scores on Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning resulted in lower
critical lure memory, but those participants who were high on both subtests tended to
remember the critical lure more often. Zhu (2010a) noted that having a lower IQ was
associated with higher false memory at recognition. Again, the immediacy of false recall
could be the reason for this difference.
Our hypothesis for age being an important predictor of false memory was partially
supported. Specifically, there was no significant relationship noted between age and
critical lure recall. Thus, there were no developmental reversals in false memory
observed in this sample (Holliday et al., 2011). An age difference in recognition accuracy
was revealed with older children having a higher “Hit” rate than younger children. This
result is consistent with previous research showing that older children and adults have a
larger general memory capacity than younger children (Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011;
Metzger et al., 2008).
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A major strength of this study was the method in which socioeconomic status was
assessed. Rather than combining different important aspects of socioeconomic status into
a single score, gross family income, maternal, and paternal education were included as
individual variables in analyses to assess their unique contribution to outcomes. As a
result of this method, the relationship between critical lure proportion recall and maternal
education was identified. However, no major differences were noted on any aspect of
socioeconomic status for false memories at recognition. This is in contrast to the findings
of Howe and colleagues (2004). This difference may be due to the manner in which
socioeconomic status was defined, as Howe and colleagues (2004) grouped participants
based on low- or middle-socioeconomic status. This grouping was based purely on need
for public assistance, however, and did not grasp at other aspects of SES (e.g., education).
Additionally, despite this relationship emerging between critical lure recall proportion, an
aspect of executive functioning (e.g., Animal Sorting Number of Sorts) and maternal
education, there was no significant mediation to speak of. This points to other variables
potentially driving this relationship that were unmeasured (e.g., other aspects of
socioeconomic status like cost-of-living, hours worked by parents, or per capita income)
and begs for future investigation.
This study is not without limitations. There were location differences noted
between children recruited from West Virginia and children recruited from Vermont.
Specifically, children from the Morgantown community were older and tended to have
mothers who were more highly educated (ps < .05). A sampling bias may be to blame for
these differences given that several of the participants from the Morgantown community
were University-affiliated. However, despite these location differences, there were no

FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN

33

differences between these two locations in regards to any of the outcome variables
measured. Further, this group was limited in racial/ethnic diversity and came from
primarily well-educated, higher socioeconomic status backgrounds. Compared to
previous studies, the children in this study also performed more accurately (Metzger et
al., 2008). More studies in this area should include a broader sample of children and
adolescents so stronger conclusions can be drawn.
This study did not assess for specific environmental factors that may affect
memory, aside from previous head injury, mental health diagnosis, anoxia/hypoxia, and
socioeconomic status. Other areas to consider for future research may include prenatal
drug or alcohol exposure, specific instances of trauma, typical sleep quality/quantity, and
chronic medical problems. There was also no specific assessment of effort with
participants, so it is difficult to say whether participants were performing at their best
aside from clinical judgment. This could be solved in the future with a brief version of
the word recognition tests used in this study, much like the Test of Memory Malingering
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996). DeRight and Carone’s (2015) recently published review on
effort testing in children made recommendations regarding the use of these tests, which
are often ignored with children and pediatric populations. Additionally, a parent-report of
executive functioning [e.g., the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning
(BRIEF); Gioia et al., 2000] may have provided beneficial information should children
have been giving low effort.
Child temperament may also be an important aspect that went unmeasured in this
study. Temperament is defined as the method in which a child regulates processes and
their reactivity to situations (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Considering the higher-order
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nature of these processes (much like those involved in executive functioning) this would
be important to consider in future research. Noguera and colleagues (2015) found that
children with better inhibition skills attended to words they were supposed to remember
longer than words they were supposed to ignore, whereas children low in this trait
attended to these words equally.
Measurement of executive functioning and IQ were limited in this study. The
WASI-II two-subtest measure of IQ is brief; this is beneficial for research purposes, but
may not have been the most comprehensive way to measure IQ. The use of this brief IQ
measure may also have been the reason for the strange findings regarding IQ and recall.
Additionally, the NEPSY-II assesses two aspects of executive functioning: inhibition and
cognitive flexibility. The addition of the WISC-IV Digit Span subtest added a working
memory measure for this study. There are many of aspects of executive functioning (e.g.,
initiation, planning, attention) that may be important in the creation of false memories
and should be considered in future studies.
These results point to the importance of aspects of executive functioning in false
memory production. Further research is needed to point to practical and logistic
implications of these results in child witness interviewing. All children should be
interviewed using the most empirically validated forensic methods (e.g., the Cognitive
Interview; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985)
but this may become increasingly important for children who may be lower than their
peers in aspects of intelligence and executive functioning.
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Table 1: Demographics by Age Group
Table 1
Demographics by Age Group
Younger Children
(n = 28)

Older Children
(n = 31)

Total Sample
N (%)

n

%

n

%

Male
Female

32 (54.2)
27 (45.8)

15
13

53.6
46.4

17
14

54.8
45.2

Right
Left

54 (91.5)
5 (8.5)

26
2

92.9
7.1

28
3

90.3
9.7

Caucasian
Hispanic/Latino
Biracial
Gross Family Income
$0-$14,999
$15,000-$29,999
$30,000-$44,999
$45,000-$59,999
$60,000-$74,999
$75,000-$89,999
$90,000-$99,000
$100,000-$124,999
$125,000-$149,999
$150,000-$174,999
$200,000 and over
Mother’s Highest
Degree
High school diploma
Associates
4-year college degree
Master’s degree
JD/MD/Ph.D.
Father’s Highest
Degree
Less than high school
High school diploma
Associates
4-year college degree
Master’s degree
JD/MD/Ph.D.

55 (93.2)
1 (1.7)
3 (5.1)

26
1
1

92.9
3.6
3.6

29
0
2

93.5
0
6.5

1 (1.7)
2 (3.4)
3 (5.1)
6 (10.2)
3 (5.1)
8 (13.6)
6 (10.2)
8 (13.6)
10 (16.9)
4 (6.8)
8 (13.6)

0
1
2
2
2
4
1
5
4
2
5

0
3.6
7.1
7.1
7.1
14.3
3.6
17.9
14.3
7.1
17.9

1
1
1
4
1
4
5
3
6
2
3

3.2
3.2
3.2
12.9
3.2
12.9
16.1
9.7
19.4
6.5
9.7

10 (16.9)
3 (5.1)
21 (35.6)
19 (32.2)
6 (10.2)

5
2
9
10
2

17.9
7.1
32.1
35.7
7.1

5
1
12
9
4

16.1
3.2
38.7
29
12.9

1 (1.7)
11 (18.6)
9 (15.3)
23 (39.0)
9 (15.3)
5 (8.5)

1
3
4
17
2
1

3.6
10.7
14.3
60.7
7.1
3.6

0
8
5
6
7
1

0
25.8
16.1
19.4
22.6
12.9

Gender

Handedness

Ethnicity
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Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Research Tasks
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Research Tasks
Younger
Children
(n = 28)
Total Sample
M (SD)
M
SD
1,2
WASI-II
Vocabulary
57.98 (8.57)
57.50
9.18
Matrix Reasoning
52.27 (8.61)
51.50
8.38
Full-Scale IQ 108.80 (12.16) 107.71 13.29
Executive
Functioning
NEPSY-II1
Animal Sorting:
11.37 (3.60)
11.82
4.32
Scaled Score
Animal Sorting:
11.56 (3.42)
11.89
4.10
Number of Sorts
Scaled Score
Inhibition: Naming
10.22 (3.33)
11.07
3.51
Combined Scaled
Score
Inhibition: Inhibition
10.34 (3.04)
10.36
2.68
Combined Scaled
Score
Inhibition: Switching
10.66 (2.73)
10.79
2.86
Combined Scaled
Score
WISC-IV1
Digit Span:
10.10 (2.48)
10.5
2.32
Backward Scaled
Score
DRM Lists
Recall
35.39 (5.18)
32.54
4.80
Recognition3: True
17.32 (2.90)
16.50
3.34
Positive
Recognition3: True
77.39 (6.77)
77.43
5.43
Negative
Recognition3: False
9.61 (6.77)
9.57
5.43
Positive
Recognition3: False
3.68 (2.90)
4.5
3.34
Negative
COWAT: Animals
17.76 (5.34)
15.5
5.33

Older Children
(n = 31)
M

SD

58.42
52.97
109.77

8.12
8.89
11.18

10.97

2.81

11.26

2.71

9.45

3.02

10.32

3.37

10.55

2.64

9.74

2.61

37.97
18.06

4.09
2.24

77.35

7.88

9.65

7.88

2.94

2.24

20.30

4.14

Note 1: WASI-II, NEPSY-II, and WISC-IV M= 10, SD= 3; Note 2: FSIQ M = 100, SD = 15;
Note 2: Previously presented words: 21; Unpresented words: 87
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Table 5: Summary of Multiple Regression: Proportion of Critical Lure Production at
Recall
Table 5
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Proportion of Critical Lure Production at Recall
(N = 59)
B
SE(B)
β
t
Sig. (p)
Variable
WASI-II
Vocabulary Scaled Score
.037
.014
8.914
2.572
.016
Matrix Reasoning Scaled
Score

.037

.014

8.668

2.543

.017

FSIQ-2
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting
Scaled Score

-.044

.016

-15.277

-2.662

.013

-.012

.007

-1.353

-1.838

.077

.015

.007

1.619

2.158

.040

-.002

.008

-.166

-.275

.786

Naming Combined Scaled
Score

.002

.003

.176

.651

.520

Inhibition Combined Scaled
Score

.006

.005

.542

1.232

.229

-.008

.006

-.569

-1.354

.187

-.008

.011

-.611

-.723

.476

.001

.007

.043

.073

.942

.005

.006

.334

.716

.480

-.012

.012

-.169

-.955

.348

-.001

.002

-.051

-.273

.787

.016

.006

.549

2.683

.012

-.004

.006

-.130

-.641

.527

.003

.004

.146

.811

.424

Total Number of Sorts
Scaled Score
NEPSY-II: Inhibition
Total Errors Scaled Score

Switching Combined Scaled
Score
WISC-IV: Digit Span
Scaled Score
Forward Scaled Score
Backward Scaled Score
Age
Gross Family Income
Maternal Highest Degree
Paternal Highest Degree
COWAT: Animals Z-score

Note: FSIQ-2 = Full Scale IQ, 2 subtest
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Figure 1: Recall Mediation

.151

Total Sorts
Scaled Score
Figure 1

Maternal
Education

.179 (.162)

.137

Critical Lure
Proportion
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Table 6: Summary of Multiple Regression: Critical Lures at Recognition
Table 6
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Critical Lures Remembered at Recognition
(N = 59)
B
SE(B)
β
t
Sig. (p)
Variable
WASI-II
Vocabulary Scaled Score
.253
.585
1.895
.433
.669
Matrix Reasoning Scaled
Score

.199

.587

1.459

.339

.737

-.283

.670

-3.067

-.423

.676

-.394

.269

-1.364

-1.467

.154

.422

.288

1.390

1.466

.154

.161

.332

.370

.486

.631

Naming Combined Scaled
Score

-.067

.115

-.200

-.585

.563

Inhibition Combined Scaled
Score

.073

.205

.199

.358

.723

-.362

.234

-.824

-1.551

.133

-.110

.463

-.253

-.237

.814

-.083

.298

-.207

-.277

.784

.084

.259

.191

.323

.749

-.835

.498

-.374

-1.675

.106

-.030

.093

-.076

-.319

.752

.105

.240

.113

.436

.667

.058

.245

.060

.235

.816

.140

.164

.194

.856

.400

FSIQ-2
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting
Scaled Score
Total Number of Sorts
Scaled Score
NEPSY-II: Inhibition
Total Errors Scaled Score

Switching Combined Scaled
Score
WISC-IV: Digit Span
Scaled Score
Forward Scaled Score
Backward Scaled Score
Age
Gross Family Income
Maternal Highest Degree
Paternal Highest Degree
COWAT: Animals Z-score
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Table 7: Summary of Multiple Regression: Correct Hits at Recognition
Table 7
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Correct Hits at Recognition (N = 59)
B
SE(B)
β
t
Variable
WASI-II
Vocabulary Scaled Score
.035
.054
2.267
.647
Matrix Reasoning Scaled
Score

Sig. (p)
.523

.026

.054

1.679

.487

.630

-.034

.061

-3.201

-.551

.586

-.005

.025

-.163

-.219

.828

.023

.026

.658

.867

.394

-.001

.030

-.027

-.044

.965

Naming Combined Scaled
Score

.005

.011

.137

.500

.621

Inhibition Combined Scaled
Score

.010

.019

.246

.552

.585

-.019

.021

-.368

-.866

.394

.004

.042

.076

.089

.930

-.010

.027

-.221

-.370

.714

.011

.024

.218

.462

.648

.106

.046

.414

2.316

.028

-.026

.009

-.571

-3.011

.006

.029

.022

.273

1.319

.198

.001

.022

.013

.062

.951

.025

.015

.302

1.663

.108

FSIQ-2
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting
Scaled Score
Total Number of Sorts
Scaled Score
NEPSY-II: Inhibition
Total Errors Scaled Score

Switching Combined Scaled
Score
WISC-IV: Digit Span
Scaled Score
Forward Scaled Score
Backward Scaled Score
Age
Gross Family Income
Maternal Highest Degree
Paternal Highest Degree
COWAT: Animals Z-score
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Table 8: Summary of Multiple Regression: False Alarms (Memories) at Recognition
Table 8
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for False Alarms at Recognition (N = 59)
B
SE(B)
β
t
Variable
WASI-II
Vocabulary Scaled Score
.023
.042
2.588
.548
Matrix Reasoning Scaled
Score

Sig. (p)
.588

.022

.042

2.366

.510

.614

-.027

.048

-4.374

-.560

.580

-.029

.019

-1.507

-1.504

.144

.030

.021

1.504

1.471

.153

.028

.024

.954

1.161

.256

Naming Combined Scaled
Score

-.010

.008

-.448

-1.218

.234

Inhibition Combined Scaled
Score

.003

.015

.105

.176

.862

-.038

.017

-1.294

-2.260

.032

-.009

.033

-.311

-.270

.789

.000

.021

.006

.008

.994

.006

.019

.197

.310

.759

-.006

.036

-.041

-.172

.865

-.006

.007

-.238

-.931

.360

.013

.017

.212

.761

.453

.000

.018

.003

.012

.990

.015

.012

.312

1.278

.212

FSIQ-2
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting
Scaled Score
Total Number of Sorts
Scaled Score
NEPSY-II: Inhibition
Total Errors Scaled Score

Switching Combined Scaled
Score
WISC-IV: Digit Span
Scaled Score
Forward Scaled Score
Backward Scaled Score
Age
Gross Family Income
Maternal Highest Degree
Paternal Highest Degree
COWAT: Animals Z-score

